Search results for " Asymmetric Information"

showing 3 items of 3 documents

Insights on Partial Information Sharing in Supply Chain dynamics

2015

This paper provides an assessment of partial Information Sharing (IS) in Supply Chain (SC). We study the dynamics of collaborative multi-echelon structure, characterized by an increasing level of information visibility among partners. To do so, we mathematically model six four-echelon serial SCs via difference equations and conduct numerical simulations on the basis of a robust design of experiment. Results shows how (1) as the extent of IS increases, the performance of whole SC improves as well, and (2) the impact of IS depends not on which particular members are involved but on the number of collaborative members.

Information managementStructure (mathematical logic)demand amplificationANOVA; asymmetric information sharing; demand amplification; simulation; supply chain collaboration; supply chain dynamics; Strategy and Management1409 Tourism Leisure and Hospitality Management; Industrial and Manufacturing EngineeringMathematical optimizationsupply chain dynamicsKnowledge managementANOVAsupply chain dynamicComputer sciencebusiness.industryInformation sharingSupply chainStrategy and Management1409 TourismLeisure and Hospitality ManagementVisibility (geometry)supply chain collaborationNumerical modelsasymmetric information sharingsimulationSettore ING-IND/35 - Ingegneria Economico-GestionaleIndustrial and Manufacturing EngineeringRobust designDynamics (music)business
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Extortion, firm's size and the sectoral allocation of capital

2014

Extortion of firms is a typical activity of organized crime such as Mafia. We develop a simple principal-agent model to find the Mafia-optimal extortion as a function of firm’s observable characteristics, specifically firm’s size. We test the predictions of the model on a unique dataset on extortion in Sicily, the Italian region where Mafia is most active. Our empirical findings show that i) extortion moderately increases with firm’s size ii) extortion is regressive, the average extortion rate ranging from approximately 40% of operating profits for small firms to 2% for large firms iii) extortion turns average cost function decreasing, therefore influencing market competition

Organized Crime Economic Structure Sicilian Mafia Asymmetric Information Principal-Agent Theory.Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica
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The Economics of Extortion: Theory and Evidence on the Sicilian Mafia

2019

This paper studies extortion of firms operating in legal sectors by a profit-maximizing criminal organization. We develop a simple principal-agent model under asymmetric information to find the Mafia-optimal extortion as a function of firms' observable characteristics, namely size and sector. We test the predictions of the model on a unique dataset on extortion in Sicily, the Italian region where the most powerful criminal organization, the Mafia, operates. In line with our theoretical model, our empirical findings show that extortion is strongly concave in firm's size and highly regressive. The percentage of profits appropriated by Mafia ranges from 40% for small firms to 2% for large firm…

Organized Crime Extortion Sicilian Mafia Asymmetric Information Principal-Agent TheorySettore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica
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